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1. PT:  the primary transmitter
2. PR:  the primary receiver
3. SU:  a secondary user
4. ITT:  the interference temperature threshold
5. PI:  the average interference power in Watts centered at m
6. m:  a given measurement point
7. W:  bandwidth measured in Hertz
8. k:  Boltzmann’s constant, 1.38 x 10-23 Joules per Kelvin degree
9. a:  the effective communication area (ECA) for primary user 1
10. b:  the effective communication area (ECA) for primary user 2
11. xa:  the measurement point for ECA a
12. xb:  the measurement point for ECA b
13. T:  the interference temperature threshold for a certain ECA
14. Ta:  the interference temperature threshold for primary user 1
15. Tb:  the interference temperature threshold for primary user 2
16. pi:  user i’s transmit power
17. 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛:  user i’s minimum transmit power
18. 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥:  user i’s maximum transmit power
19. Pi:  user i’s achievable power
20. N:  the total number of secondary users
21. n:  the number of secondary users interfering with the primary
transmitter
22. N-n:  the number of secondary users interfering with the primary receiver
23. gij:  the link gain from user i’s transmitter to user j’s receiver
24. gim:  the link gain from user i’s transmitter to a measurement point m
25. 𝛾:  represents the signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR)
26. 𝜎2:  represents the background noise at secondary receiver
27. p:  the transmit power vector of a given ECA
28. p*:  the transmit power vector after the backing off process
29. ui:  the efficiency function which presents the throughput of
communication systems in the high SINR regime
30. B:  denotes the set of secondary users that have backed off their
transmissions
31. Ui:  denotes user i’s utility
32. τ:  the pricing function used to incorporate direct trust and reputation
33. C:  the level of confidence that must be maintained in order to forward
network traffic
34. α:  the vector that represents the history of positive interactions with
other users at a given time
35. β:  the vector that represents the history of negative interactions with
other users at a given time
36. ti:  denotes user i’s measure of direct trust for any given one-hop
neighbor
ix 
37. H:  the set of one-hop neighbors for a specified user
38. S:  the set of shared neighbors between a user that has received a
request and the requester
39. L:  denotes the requester of a cooperation link
40. G:  represents the undirected network graph
41. V:  the players in the network graph
42. E:  the set of links connecting two interacting players in the network
graph
43. D:  a path
44. vk:  a player on a directed link of a path
45. S:  the action space of a primary transmitter
46. s(i):  an action; add a link or back off a link
47. 𝑆̅:  an action preference list that represents the PT’s beneficial actions
sorted in increasing order by distance from the PT
48. s(i*):  denotes the best action of the PT
49. K:  the set of players on a path from PT to PR
50. d*:  a path profile that describes the Nash equilibrium for the reputation-
based power control game
51. 𝛾e:  the effective SINR, which is defined as the minimum SINR of all hops
along the path D
52. ei:  the distance of each player from the PT in a given effective
communication area
53. A:  the distance of the player with the largest distance from the PT
54. xi:  the variable that drives the inverse linear distribution used to satisfy
the Nash equilibrium
55. fi:  the function (pigim) that describes the inverse linear distribution used
to satisfy the Nash equilibrium
56. E:  the sum of all players’ distances from the PT in a given ECA
57. 𝜃:  a numeric factor that represents the increase added to the ITT if a
player violates the strategy





One of the major challenges for today’s wireless communications is to 
meet the growing demand for supporting an increasing diversity of wireless 
applications with limited spectrum resource.  In cooperative communications 
and networking, users share resources and collaborate in a distributed 
approach, similar to entities of active social groups in self organizational 
communities.  Users’ information may be shared by the user and also by the 
cooperative users, in distributed transmission.  Cooperative communications 
and networking is a fairly new communication paradigm that promises 
significant capacity and multiplexing gain increase in wireless networks. 
This research will provide a cooperative relay selection framework that 
exploits the similarity of cognitive radio networks to social networks.  It offers a 
multi-hop, reputation-based power control game for routing.  In this 
dissertation, a social network model provides a humanistic approach to 







The recent increase in wireless technology has led to much research 
related to spectrum leasing, resource allocation, prioritized traffic, and 
numerous other areas. Several solutions to these areas involve using 
cooperative communication among various wireless devices. Cooperative 
communication occurs in a multi-agent environment where nodes, often called 
users, cooperate with one another in order to improve their performance and 
that of the overall network, while maintaining power efficiency and reducing 
delay.  Cooperative communication has potential applications in many different 
types of networks, including cellular, ad-hoc, and cognitive networks. 
One of the major challenges for today’s wireless communications is to 
meet the growing demand for supporting an increasing diversity of wireless 
applications with limited spectrum resource.  Traditional wireless networks 
have predominantly used direct point-to-point (one-to-one) or point-to-
multipoint (one-to-many) topologies. In cooperative communications and 
networking, users share resources and collaborate in a distributed approach, 
similar to entities of active social groups in self organizational communities.  
Users’ information may be shared by the user and also by the cooperative 
users, in distributed transmission.  This is different from conventional point-to-
point communications.  Cooperative communications and networking is a fairly 
new communication paradigm that promises significant capacity and 
multiplexing gain increase in wireless networks. 
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Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been well recognized for their 
ability to exploit the mutual beneficial relationship among users, distinguished 
here as primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs), to facilitate cooperative 
communication. Considerable research has been conducted on CRNs in 
relation to developing hardware, algorithms, and protocols that are needed for 
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) capable cognitive networks.  However, there 
are fewer that address its network setup problem with emphasis on multi-hop 
infrastructures. More specifically, there are fewer proposed solutions to 
determine cooperative relay selection in these types of networks. 
This research will provide a cooperative relay selection framework that 
exploits the similarity of cognitive radio networks to social networks.  It offers a 
multi-hop, reputation-based power control game for routing. In this 
dissertation, a social network model provides a humanistic approach to 
predicting relay selection and network analysis in cognitive radio networks. 
1.1. General Context of Research 
1.1.1.Use Cases of Cognitive Radio Networks 
Cognitive radio technology has been exploited in many real world 
applications. These applications include CR-enabled vehicles, emergency, 
military, and cellular networks, multimedia, and sentient spaces.  CR-enabled 
vehicle (CRVs), as discussed by Felice et al. in [22], have “enabled a new class 
of in-car entertainment systems and enhanced the ability of emergency 
responders using opportunistic spectrum usage enabled by CR technology”.  
These vehicles are capable of using systems outside of the IEEE 802.11p 
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specified standard band.  Additionally, they have enhanced features for drivers’ 
safety, traffic monitoring, and in-car streaming video entertainment options. 
Public safety and military users have direct applications for cognitive 
radios.  In these markets, situation awareness is critical.  Entities in these 
networks rely on Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and other instantaneous 
data to assist with disasters and other operations.  Awareness of the user’s 
physical setting in both space and time may diminish uncertainty and 
encourage better situation-based radio resource management [23].  Here, users 
may be first responders, soldiers, or other government personnel. 
Another emerging consumer market are sentient spaces.  This refers to 
environments where a wide variety of wireless products and services work 
together in a single location (i.e. a home, business, or apartment building).  
Often a diversity of cellular (e.g. 3G, 4G), broadcast (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth), and 
broadband (e.g. WiMAX) radio resources are available in these environments.  
This could be applied to both elder care and child care.  According to [23], 
sentient homes may include video cameras and voice recognition to assist 
elderly tenants in remembering to take their prescriptions, enabling home 
safety, and even turning off the stove. 
1.1.2.Potential Correlation of CRNs to Social Networks 
Cognitive radio networks are ideal communication systems for the 
aforementioned use cases because they are able to perform dynamic spectrum 
allocation and adapt their transmission and reception parameters, similar to 
the adaptive behavior of social entities.  Cognitive radio networks aim to 
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stimulate interaction between a primary transmitter and the intended primary 
receiver through secondary users, just as online communities, such as 
Facebook, aim to stimulate social interaction among friends.  The users of 
CRNs are capable of sensing active and inactive frequency channels, as well as, 
determining neighboring users to assist with cooperative relay.  Similarly, 
Facebook users have established friends and are able to detect connections to 
other individuals and groups by analyzing relationships and other shared 
links.  Cognitive users may share channel experience, interaction history, and 
path data, while users of online communities may share artefacts such as 
photos, videos, and games. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
This research examines the applicability of social networking and social 
capital theories in the context of cognitive radio networks’ ability to form 
networks that improve the overall utility for primary users and to predict users’ 
intentions in network formation, a technique that could be employed in urgent 
conditions, emergency situations and various other scenarios.  A major 
concern in CRNs is relay selection in a distributed, multi-hop environment.  
Direct transmissions from a primary transmitter to the intended primary 
receiver are ideal but may be severely degraded by multi-path fading and 
shadowing due to the unstable, dynamic environment present in wireless 
communications [15].   
The social phenomena underlying online communities can be directly 
related to network formation.  These communities have become an integral part 
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of everyday life, with over 2 billion Internet users logging in countless hours per 
month [47]. Research in building, discovering and analyzing online 
communities is increasingly important as the Internet becomes the largest 
collection of ideas, personalities, and cultures in history [41]. These 
communities represent groups of individuals connected by some social relation, 
such as a trusted contact link in a business network, a family relationship, or 
a collegiate organization. 
This dissertation focuses on a need to understand the social networking 
aspect of relay selection in cognitive radio networks.  It aims to determine if 
humanistic behavior patterns may be applied to forming a successful 
communication chain in CRNs.  
Prior research has proposed a trust-aware resource allocation scheme in 
a cognitive radio network with a system-level trust model in which 
trustworthiness is used as social capital to gain system resources [40].  The 
focus of [40] is to improve radio spectrum utilization in a centralized CRN.  It 
describes a reputation model that grants access to resources (i.e. frequency 
bands) based on a reputation model. [43] develops a trust-based data 
aggregation scheme to cope with malicious secondary user attack in 
cooperative spectrum sensing.  Their proposed solutions only partially address 
the use of social capital in CRNs.  They do not examine the appropriateness of 
social networking theory to cognitive radio networks nor address its use in 
relay selection. Our research aims to provide a possible explanation or 
correlation to the phenomenon of multi-hop relay selection by testing 
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humanistic behavior patterns, which help to influence user intentions in social 
networking. 
1.3. Research Objectives and Questions 
The objective of this research is to help build a better understanding of 
social networking and social capital theory in the area of cognitive radio 
networks.  The focus of this dissertation is on cognitive users’ ability to predict 
network formation in cognitive radio networks based on social networking 
theories.  Four primary goals for this study are presented here: 
 First, to provide a game-theoretic approach to the multi-hop network 
setup problem in cognitive radio networks using a reputation-based 
power control model, 
 Second, to provide empirical evidence about primary users’ ability to 
form a network (i.e. the probability of establishing a path) in cognitive 
radio networks with a higher utility than direct transmission, 
 Third, to test social network models’ ability to predict network 
formation in the cognitive radio network environment, and 
 Fourth, to build awareness about the potential uses of social 
networking theory in cognitive radio network environments. 
The goal is a theoretical exploration for the discussion of cognitive users’ 
intention to cooperate in network formation and the effectiveness of a social 
network model to predict such intentions.  The research questions are based 
on literature from multi-hop CRN solutions as well as social network theories.  
Using a simulated cognitive radio network in the WiMAX module of the network 
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simulator ns-3 as a test bed, this investigation attempts to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. Is the newly proposed reputation-based model comparable to existing 
trust schemes? 
2. How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary users affected by 
incorporating the proposed game-theoretic approach to network 
formation? 
3. Can network constructions derived from social network models 
predict actual linkages in a cooperative multi-hop relaying network? 
4. What is the current use of social networking theory and social capital 
to predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks? 
1.4. Guide to the Dissertation 
In chapter 2, the definitions of cognitive radios and cognitive radio 
networks are presented.  Because this dissertation is grounded in cooperative 
relay selection, section 2.2 of the literature review presents various cooperation 
frameworks for cognitive users.  Section 2.3 discusses social networking 
theories and social capital, along with current research relevant to cognitive 
radio networks.  Section 2.4 describes a social network model and its relevancy 
to CRNs. 
In chapter 3, the research questions are reiterated and the propositions 
are introduced.  A theoretical research model is also presented that provides a 
game-theoretic approach to the multi-hop network setup problem in CRNs 
using a reputation-based model. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the methodology employed to investigate the 
research questions and test the propositions.  The simulation environment is 
also described in this chapter.  The overall procedures used for testing the 
social network models are presented in this chapter.  Chapter 5 provides 








The definition of a cognitive radio is important here because they 
establish the foundation for this research.  A cognitive radio (CR) is an 
intelligent radio that can be reconfigured dynamically. Such a radio 
automatically detects the current state of a network, by determining channel 
availability, traffic, neighboring users, and other network parameters. It 
adjusts transmission and reception parameters (i.e. transmit power, frequency, 
and modulation) in real-time to facilitate reliable communication and optimize 
concurrent wireless communications in a given spectrum band.  The FCC 
defines a cognitive radio as “a radio that can change its transmitter parameters 
based on interaction with the environment in which it operates”. [8] 
Cognitive radios adapt if interference is detected by exploiting both 
licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands.  They can detect frequencies and 
bandwidth where conventional radios cannot; therefore, extracting more 
wireless bandwidth.  This is accomplished by utilizing Software Defined Radio 
(SDR), which will be discussed shortly. This concept promotes flexible 
communication and efficient resource allocation to more sophisticated levels, 
by presenting spectrum sharing, coexistence, and interoperability and 
cooperation among heterogeneous wireless networks. 
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Mitola introduced this concept in [19].  His research states that cognitive 
radio “supports automated reasoning about the needs of the user” and 
“empowers software radios to conduct expressive negotiations among peers 
about the use of radio spectrum across fluents of space, time, and user 
context”.  Mitola further explained cognitive radio as an extension to SDR 
through a Radio Knowledge Representation Language (RKRL).  
Simply, RKRL is an algorithm in a software radio.  It provides a standard 
language where data exchanges can occur dynamically.  Data exchanges may 
include, but are not limited to, remote software programming for bug fixes and 
upgrades and location-aware services for emergency response and military use. 
According to [24], a cognitive radio has two major subsystems, a 
cognitive unit that makes decisions based on various stimuli in the 
environment and a flexible SDR unit whose operating software is reconfigurable 
according to predefined policies and regulations.  A separate spectrum sensing 
subsystem may be included to detect spectrum holes (i.e. frequency bands not 
used by licensed users or having limited interference with them) and to 
recognize the presence of radio resources, services, and/or users.  These 
subsystems may not be defined as a single piece of equipment, but instead may 
be distributed across various components in a cognitive network. 
The figure below from [24] more clearly defines the cognitive unit 
previously referenced.  It is composed of a cognitive engine and a policy engine.  
The cognitive engine’s primary purpose is to optimize a performance goal based 
on inputs obtained from the radio’s current internal state and surrounding 
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environment.  The policy engine partners with the cognitive engine to ensure 
that the solution it produced remains in compliance with predefined policies 
and regulations. 
Figure 1:  Cognitive Radio Concept Architecture [24] 
[21] describes the capabilities of cognitive radios (cognitive, 
reconfigurable, and self-organized) by classifying them based on their 
functionality.  Below are the features of each. 
Cognitive Capability 
1. Spectrum sensing:  a CR’s ability to sense radio spectrum and detect
spectrum holes. 
12 
2. Spectrum sharing:  refers to a mechanism that would enable sharing of 
spectrum under the terms of an agreement between a licensee and a 
third party.  Negotiation may be permitted on an ad hoc, real-time basis. 
3. Location identification:  a radio’s ability to determine its location and the 
location of neighboring nodes in its environment and then select and/or 
adjust corresponding transmission and reception parameters. 
4. Network/System discovery:  the detection of available one-hop or multi-
hop access networks. 
5. Service discovery:  the determination of appropriate services needed from 
network or system operators. 
Reconfigurable Capability 
1. Frequency agility:  the ability of a CR to change its operating frequency. 
2. Dynamic frequency selection:  a mechanism that dynamically detects 
signals from other radio frequency systems and avoids collisions with 
those systems. 
3. Adaptive modulation/coding:  strategies that modify operating 
parameters to provide more efficient solutions for spectrum access.  
4. Transmit power control:  a feature that enables a device to dynamically 
switch between several transmission power levels in the data 
transmission process. 
5. Dynamic system/network access:  a radio’s ability to reconfigure itself or 
change modes to be compatible with multiple communication systems 
following different protocols. 
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Self-Organized Capability 
1. Spectrum/Radio resource management:  techniques to manage spectrum
holes. 
2. Mobility and connection management: features to enhance 
neighborhood discovery. 
3. Trust/Security management:  processes and procedures in place to
address security issues. 
2.1.2.The Cognition Cycle 
The figure below provides a pictorial representation of the cognition cycle 
by Mitola from [23]. The phases of the cognition cycle are orientation, 
planning, learning, deciding, acting, and observation.  Sensory stimuli is 
obtained from the surrounding environment.  It then enters the cycle through 
sensory perception and object-level change detection initiates the cognition 
cycle.  Information sources for sensory perception may be radio frequency, 
speech, text, location, etc. 
According to [23], cognitive radios frequently observe their environment, 
orient themselves (SEE), create plans (THINK), make independent and 
cooperative decisions with other users and networks (TALK), and act on devised 
solutions.  Thus, cognitive radios are comparable to persons.  Actions may be 
physical or virtual. For instance, transmitting a signal, movement, and 
associating a user’s action with the current situation are all considered actions. 
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Figure 2:  The Cognition Cycle as Defined by Mitola [23] 
Another interpretation of the cognition cycle can be seen in the next figure. 
2.1.3.Cognitive Radio Networks 
A cognitive radio network (CRN) is an intelligent, self-organizing network 
that changes its transmission and reception parameters to communicate 
effectively, while avoiding interference from other licensed users.  It is a 
complex adaptive system of heterogeneous entities that display nonlinear 
behavior.  This wireless architecture utilizes a communication system that does 
not operate in a fixed, assigned band. Instead, spectrum sensing is used. This 
requires users to continuously scan channels to determine availability. The list 
of free channels may vary from node to node and cluster to cluster.  
15 
 
Figure 3:  The Cognition Cycle as Defined by [18] 
In CRNs, nodes are distinguished as either primary or secondary users. 
Primary users (PUs) are those that have current license agreements with the 
FCC which have yet to expire. Secondary users (SUs), also referred to as 
cognitive users (CUs), communicate only in those frequencies in which the 
primary users are inactive [17].  According to [16], primary users intend to find 
a network path with a higher bit rate and a lower delay.  On the other hand, a 
secondary user’s objective is to gain channel access and, therefore, a higher 
throughput for itself, while simultaneously preserving energy consumption as it 
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transmits primary traffic.  Cooperative communication exploits this mutually 
beneficial relationship. 
There are various application data types that are transmitted during the 
normal operations of a wireless device. These types vary by user and function. 
Each of these applications has unique performance characteristics that affect 
their normal operations. Not only are the application-specific network handling 
requirements varied, but the impact to the overall network is varied. The 
network must be able to effortlessly support this diversity. The concept of 
associating application-specific design requirements with the network 
dynamics of the frequency spectrum lends itself to a quality-of-service (QoS) 
methodology [2]. 
The dynamic nature of cognitive radio networks imposes unique 
challenges on network setup.  Cooperative transmissions are essential to the 
efficient operation of such networks.  Most existing research focuses on the 
single-hop relay selection of a primary transmitter-receiver pair.  This research 
models multi-hop scenarios as a network formation game using a reputation-
based infrastructure and transmit power control. Models of trust are 
maintained about neighboring users, forming a reputation mechanism.  
Additionally, an interference temperature threshold is enforced to protect 
primary users and to provide a method for imposing punishment on users who 
violate the network policy. 
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2.1.4. Software Defined Radios 
As mentioned earlier, CRs extend Software Defined Radio as a means to 
enable communication in cognitive radio networks.  SDR technologies can 
provide reconfigurable radios with the flexibility, cost efficiency, and power 
essential for them to maximize their potential, the benefits of which can help to 
increase system efficiencies realized by both service providers and end users.   
The SDR Forum, along with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE) P1900.1 group, has formed a definition of Software Defined 
Radio as “radio in which some or all of the physical layer functions are software 
defined”.  Simply, a radio is any kind of device that wirelessly transmits or 
receives signals in the radio frequency (RF) part of the electromagnetic 
spectrum to facilitate the transfer of information [24].  Radios exist in 
computers, mobile phones, garage door openers, televisions, and many other 
commonly used devices. 
 With the tremendous growth in communication methods, traditional 
hardware based radio devices are limited in that they can only be modified 
through physical revision.  As demand increases, SDR offers a more affordable 
solution through reconfigurable operating software that allows multi-mode, 
multi-band, and/or multi-functional wireless devices the ability to perform 
software upgrades.  This is accomplished through modifiable software or 
firmware operating on programmable processing technologies. 
 This research proposes a technique that serves as an add-on component 
to the existing primary network and is opportunistically harvested.  It does not 
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call for major change in the existing primary infrastructure, and therefore is of 
great practical interest. 
2.2. Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks 
In an exhaustive search of literature for studies related to relay selection 
in cognitive radio networks, a variety of articles were uncovered that 
investigated the phenomenon of cooperative relay selection in centralized and 
distributed networks, single-hop and multi-hop infrastructures, reputation-
based approaches, and power control methods.  The following section identifies 
articles relevant to the research. 
Jing et al. in [15] addressed the challenge of efficiently selecting an 
appropriate relay node in order to satisfy the quality-of-service needs of the 
primary transmitter.  Because cognitive radio networks have the potential to 
have a large number of secondary users, it may not be feasible to observe all 
neighboring nodes.  [15] introduced an optimal stopping rule to the selection 
process that compares the instantaneous reward and the expected reward of 
future observations.  The channel quality of the “candidate relay” represents 
the instantaneous reward, and the expected reward of future observations is 
the reward the primary user can obtain if it continues observing the 
subsequent candidate relays.  They studied the impacts of their algorithm in 
terms of the number of observation steps and the average reward for the PU 
pair.  They discovered that the number of SU candidate relays influences the 
relay selection performance and that the primary user should stop observation 
quickly to avoid generating a large cost.  Additionally, Jing et al. found that the 
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size of the network was directly related to the number of observation steps, 
because the PU pair has more relay options.  Here, secondary users are also 
used to enhance the performance of primary users; however, the focus is 
strictly on single hop relaying. 
In [5], Huang, Han, Chiang, and Poor describe two auction mechanisms 
that determine relay selection and relay power allocation by maximizing total 
rate increase.  This study seeks to determine when a user should relay, based 
on a threshold policy, and how a user should select a relay and allocate its 
resources.  It provides a distributed algorithm using auction theory, tested on a 
single relay network, to address the challenge of efficient resource allocation in 
cognitive radio networks.  This study does not investigate its benefit to primary 
users.  Its results are isolated to the performance of secondary users, as does 
this research. 
The solution provided in [6] explored trust as related to network layer 
functions in a cognitive radio network.  The network layer functions include 
location management, handoff management, and security.  The framework to 
model trust is computed as a function of the routing path.  The overall trust is 
determined by multiplying the reputation value at each segment along the 
path.  In this model, trust is irreversible, and the trust through an intermediate 
node cannot be higher than the originating node.  [6] does not consider trust 
for cooperative relay selection to improve the payoff of primary users. 
[12] concentrated on the property-rights model as an approach to grant 
spectrum access to secondary users.  In the property-rights model, primary 
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users own the spectral resource and have the authority to lease part of it to 
cognitive users in exchange for compensation.  The proposed solution is 
modeled as a Stackelberg game where secondary nodes have the option to 
cooperate or not.  It has a hierarchical structure, where the primary 
transmitter’s goal is to enhance its quality-of-service in terms of rate and 
probability of outage.  Although [12] employs the cooperation of secondary 
users and utilizes a distributed power control method, its primary goal is 
toward spectrum sharing and identifying spectrum holes, instead of relay 
selection.  Also, it does not consider trust as a metric. 
A game theoretic model is also provided in [16].  Here the network setup 
problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, as in [12].  Although both solutions 
are applied to multi-hop scenarios, [16] devised a cooperation framework in 
which the primary traffic and the secondary traffic are separated in the 
frequency domain and the relays share the leased sub-channel in the time 
domain, in an attempt to alleviate interference and reduce delay in the 
network.  This research found that a larger transmit power can enlarge the 
transmission range, resulting in more cooperation opportunities for both the 
primary and secondary users.  It also reported that larger transmit power could 
reduce user payoffs, if no more relays can be invited to participate in the 
cooperative transmissions.  Different from our research, [16] considers the 
existence of more than one primary transmitter and primary receiver pair, 
competing over a single set of secondary users.  Its algorithm allows secondary 
users to accept or reject an offer from a primary transmitter based its payoff, 
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even if it is currently in cooperation with another primary transmitter.  This 
research does not consider power control nor trust as metrics for cooperation. 
[13] discusses the application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11 standard, specifically 
in the distributed coordination function (DCF).  In this game, each player 
(node) has two strategies:  Transmit or Not Transmit.  Users choose a strategy 
based on the probability of a function determined by payoffs of a successful 
transmission, an idle node, and a failed transmission.  [13] focuses on the 
under-utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum and provides an original 
technique to identify spectrum holes. 
[4] presented a reputation mechanism that applies the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to relay selection.  In this mechanism, a centralized authority keeps 
records of the cooperative behavior and punishes non-cooperating nodes.  Each 
node is a player and the strategy is whether to cooperate or not.  This paper 
emphases the various techniques available to provide incentives to cooperate in 
cooperative communication. 
[28] focuses on secondary communication where transmitters and 
receivers are located in different areas of primary users with varying spectrum 
diversity. It proposes a cooperative relay scheme to “improve spectrum 
utilization and increase the SINR of secondary communication”.  This study 
focuses on the Interference Power Constraint as a general scheme of power 
control.  It exploits a single relay node to improve the received SINR, based on 
the relay’s location between the transmitter and receiver nodes.  The emphasis 
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here is determining whether or not to employ the use of a relay node strictly for 
improved utility for secondary users, as opposed to primary users.  
A noncooperative power control game is presented in [54].  Similar to 
[28], Jia and Zhang present a framework for spectrum sharing in [54] that 
concentrates on an interference temperature limit, in only one effective 
communication area.  This research uses an exclusive user model for spectrum 
sharing.  Here, a primary user has “exclusive and transferable rights to the 
user of a specified spectrum within a defined geographic area, with flexible 
spectrum use rights that are governed primarily by technical rules to protect 
spectrum against interference” [54].  In this model, users’ transmissions are 
backed off if they violate the interference temperature limit.  This backing off 
technique affects their quality-of-service and overall payoff function.  [54] only 
focuses on secondary communication.  Its game does not involve secondary 
users assisting with primary user communication.  Additionally, this use of 
power control is geared toward spectrum sharing instead of relay selection.  In 
contrast to [54], the original technique presented in this research uses power 
control to evaluate trustworthiness of neighboring nodes and provides a 
forgiveness mechanism that allows users to re-enter game play after violation 
of any constraints.  
2.3. Social Networking Theories and Social Capital 
The review of literature in the previous section discussed specific 
protocols for relay selection, transmit power control, and trust in a cognitive 
radio network.  This section focuses on defining social network theory and 
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social capital and explaining how it is applicable to relay selection in cognitive 
radio networks. 
2.3.1.Social Network Theory 
Social network theory (SNT) explains how information and connections 
develop in the framework of active social groups in self organizational 
communities.  Social interaction has been studied in sociology, psychology, 
communication, and economics, with recent studies in computer networks.  
Hammond and Glenn relate social network theory to complexity theory in [52] 
because “it seeks to explain nonlinear phenomena by focusing on the flow of 
information through relationships”.  Note the similarity of this definition to that 
of cognitive radio networks presented in Section 2.1.3. 
Let’s use a Chinese marketplace to relate SNT to cognitive radio 
networks.  In this real social network, traders, farmers, and craftsmen sell their 
products and services in a highly interactive environment that constantly 
changes.  People broadcast their desire to conduct business and willingness to 
negotiate by shouting in the air.  Often times, regular customers receive a 
better deal. Friends gossip, spreading important economic and political 
information.  Trading is preferred, although money may be exchanged.  The 
marketplace is a place of exchange, where trust is gained and lost and where 
trade skills and established relationships are essential to survival. 
In CRNs, the traders, farmers, and craftsmen may be related to the 
primary users and secondary users.  Transmission rate, channel availability, 
delay, and energy conservation are resources that may be considered products 
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and services, as in the marketplace.  Users broadcast their desire to route 
information to their neighbors, and network state information is exchanged 
among users.  A history of interactions can provide information pertinent to the 
reputation of neighboring users.  Additionally, virtual currency may be 
exchanged in cognitive radio networks as an incentive to cooperate.   
Three important overlapping conceptualizations may be noted between 
social network theory and cognitive radio networks.  They include information 
and sustainability, change and emergence, and order and chaos.  First, 
information exchange is key to CRNs as a social system.  Information allows 
the individual to adapt to changes in the environment sensed by other parts of 
the network and foster sustainability [52].  Competition and collaboration in 
the network creates various trust levels among users. 
In SNT, there are strong ties and weak ties.  Strong ties consist of links 
to individuals or groups with whom you have regular and direct contact.  For 
humans, individuals have strong ties with parents and siblings.  Analogously, 
cognitive users have strong ties with one-hop neighbors.  Weak ties are the 
nodes in the network that reach beyond immediate friends and family.  That is, 
two-hop and three-hop neighbors.  Both category of ties are critical to 
communication and sustainability. 
Secondly, the ability to adapt to change in the emergence of unique 
situations is inherent, as cognitive users must adjust reception parameters 
based on outside stimuli.  They must also alternate their role in 
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communication, serving as both senders and receivers of information.  The 
roles of the primary transmitter and primary receiver pair remain consistent.   
Order can be defined as “an emergent rhythm” [52].  This may be 
displayed in CRNs as nodes replicate their relay selections in subsequent 
communications based on an established history of trust, that is, a predictable 
set of strong and weak ties.  Chaos may be easily related to a network failure, 
caused by either an individual or cluster failure.   
2.3.2.Social Capital 
Social capital is defined as the “value of the relationships we create and 
maintain within our social networks to gain access to and mobilize needed 
resources” by Smith in [41].  Social capital is dependent on initial positions in 
the social hierarchies, as well as, on the range of social ties, according to Lin in 
[36].  Research has shown that social capital is higher when members of a 
community are linked and cooperating with each other.   
In terms of sociology, it may be categorized as personal resources or 
social resources.  Lin’s differentiation of the two are as follows: 
Personal resources belong to an individual who can use and dispose 
them with freedom and without much concern for compensation.  Social 
resources are resources accessible through one’s direct and indirect ties.  
The access to and use of these resources are temporary and borrowed.  
For example, a friend’s occupational or authority position, or such 
positions of this friend’s friends, may be ego’s [an individual’s] social 
resource.  The friend may use his/her position or network to help ego to 
find a job.  These resources are borrowed and useful to achieve ego’s 
certain goal, but they remain the property of the friend or his/her 
friends. [36] 
 
Both strong and weak ties play important roles in social capital as they 
foster reciprocity, coordination, communication, and collaboration.  Behavior of 
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such ties in cognitive radio networks affords achievement of the ultimate goal, 
packet-forwarding from the primary transmitter to the primary receiver. 
Intuitively, the primary transmitter and receiver pair benefit from increased bit 
rate and decreased delay by utilizing the shared affiliations or activities of 
secondary users. 
Studies of the actual dynamic behavior of social entities has been applied 
to examining the compensation of CEOs and investigating how interpersonal 
channels affect individuals’ ability to secure more satisfactory jobs.   Research 
has led to the discovery of patterns in behavior that will be exploited here in 
the relay selection process of cognitive radio networks. 
Qin et al. view trustworthiness as social capital in cognitive radio 
networks.  It is used by the community of nodes to encourage good behavior 
and facilitate dynamic spectrum access. This research uses a similar 
approach, as it views trustworthiness as social capital in CRNs to encourage 
positive interactions and facilitate relay selection.  
This leads to a need to define trust as it relates to both social network 
analysis and cognitive radio networks.  In both areas, trust is a measure of 
uncertainty. In social network analysis, behavior is judged through 
interactions among linked entities and trust measurements are made as a 
function of these interactions [39].  Similarly, in cognitive radio networks, it is 
a measure of the confidence of a network node on the ability of other nodes to 
transmit data, while preserving the veracity of the data [39].  
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2.3.3.Applications of Social Network Theory in CRNs 
As previously mentioned, Qin et al. in [40] proposed a trust-aware 
resource allocation scheme in a cognitive radio network with a system-level 
trust model in which trustworthiness is used as social capital to gain system 
resources.  Its focus is to improve radio spectrum utilization in a centralized 
CRN.  The proposed scheme has two parts which include trust-aware 
collaborative sensing and resource allocation.  In trust-aware collaborative 
sensing, a secondary user performs a sensing operation to determine the 
activity state of a primary user and reports its observation to a base station.  
Here, a trustworthiness score is calculated for each SU.  The next step, 
resource allocation, is to maximize the total bit rate for all chosen SUs subject 
to “total transmit power, trustworthiness, and PU interference constraints”. 
Wang and Chen develop a trust-based data aggregation scheme to cope 
with malicious secondary user attacks in cooperative spectrum sensing in [43].  
The objectives of the aggregation scheme are: too provide no incentive for 
malicious SUs to report fake sensing capabilities; to minimize the cost endured 
by the “Data Fusion Center”; and to maximize the success decision rate for the 
data fusion outcome matching the ground truth channel availability.  In this 
research, the Data Fusion Center is a centralized authority that has an 
overarching view of PU channel occupancy for the network.  A game-theoretic 
design is employed as an incentive for secondary users to accurately and 
honestly relay sensing capabilities and sensing results.     
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[39] develops a relationship between the trust concepts in the social 
network theory and wireless ad hoc networks.  It examines trust in the context 
of routing and reliable forwarding of data in these networks.  It proposes a 
scheme that uses balance theory to predict bidirectional ties.  Modeled in terms 
of signed graphs, the nodes of the graph represent users and the 
positive/negative edges represent their friendly/hostile relationships.  The 
potential source of tensions are formed from three agents in a clique that 
create a cycle.  Local density measurements are used to set thresholds for 
direct trust for nodes.  In other words, there is a correlation between the 
number of direct ties a node has and the number of mutual local neighbors.  
This trust scheme incorporates indirect observations to calculate direct trust 
values and utilizes dynamic thresholds. 
The ergodicity of the dynamics of cognitive radio networks, having a grid 
topology and random deployment, by using the model of interacting particles in 
nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is studied by Li et al. in [35].  The 
ergodicity of the social behavior dynamics means “whether the dynamics will 
converge to a single equilibrium or may have multiple equilibria” [35].  This is a 
study of the social behavior propagation in cognitive radio networks, 
particularly the propagation of channel preference in the recommendation 
system using a social networks framework.  Spin systems are used to model 
cognitive radio networks.  These types of systems consist of a finite number of 
elements, each represented by either state 0 or state 1.  The overall system 
state is the collection of the individual states in continuous time, and a 
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nonnegative function can be given that displays the rate at which any given 
element flips its current state. 
In [29], Gunasekaran and Nagarajan use social network theory to 
propose a mobility model to detect the movement of the nodes within a mobile 
ad hoc network.  They introduce a Unified Relationship Matrix (URM) to 
represent relationships from multiple and heterogeneous groups.  Input to this 
mobility model is a social network matrix, which has the connections of 
individuals carrying the mobile devices.  Relationships may be intra-type 
(belonging to the same group) or inter-type (belonging to different groups).  
2.4. Social Network Model 
An exhaustive search of literature for studies related to predicting relay 
selection in cognitive radio networks using social network theory has shown a 
scarcity of research in this area.  As seen in the previous section, research has 
been conducted on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic 
spectrum access, behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility.  To my 
best knowledge, this research is the first to study the use of social network 
models to predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks. 
Social network models study the actual dynamics of social network 
formation and evolution, leading to the discovery of relationships and behavior 
patterns [41].  These models were originally developed to test for factors 
influencing social relationships among individuals.  [44] uses social network 
models in social psychological experiments to analyze the mean proportion of 
time spent speaking by doctors to different types of patients.  They have also 
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been applied to social status attainment in [36], where studies were conducted 
to determine the relationship of social capital to socioeconomic attainment.   
In contrast, Fletcher et al. applied social network models to infer 
connectivity across landscapes in areas relevant to ecology and conservation 
biology in [27].  This technique was used because the statistical models of 
social networks have the ability to reveal complex, emergent patterns with 
limited data to predict linkages.  In ecology and conservation, network analysis 
is increasingly being used to assess population connectivity across landscapes.   
 [27] considers two types of social network models, a sender-receiver 
model [31] and a latent space model [32] to predict landscape connectivity of 
“within-field movements of cactus-feeding insect (Chelindea vittiger) on patchy 
Opuntia cactus and breeding-season movements of the endangered Everglades 
snail kite (Rostrhamus sociabilis plumbeus) across wetlands in peninsular 
Florida”.  These models require empirical data on movement.  The study found 
that the sender-receiver models provided the highest predictive accuracy in 
both networks and was the only model that could account for the observed 
directionality in movement, although it predicted a higher level of exchange in 
movement than what was actually observed.  The next section discusses the 
latent space model used by Fletcher et al. in [27] and its relevance to relay 
prediction in cognitive radio networks. 
2.4.1.Latent Space Model 
Social network data, just as cognitive radio network data, typically 
consists of a set of entities, often called users, along with the links that connect 
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them.  Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock related these links as ordered pairs of 
actors in [32].  This model is described by a set of n actors and a relational tie 
yi,j, measured on each ordered pair of actors i, j = 1, …, n.  In the simplest 
cases, yi,j is a “dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of 
some relation of interest, such as friendship, collaboration, transmission of 
information or disease, and so forth” [32].   
The data is modeled as an n x n sociomatrix Y, with entries yi,j denoting 
the value of the relation from actor i to actor j.  In the binary case, yi,j = 1 
indicates the presence of an edge (direct tie) in a graph, and yi,j = 0 indicates 
the absence of a direct tie.  Cognitive radio networks may also be represented 
in this fashion, where yi,j = 1 represents one-hop neighbors (direct ties).   
Hoff et al. take a conditional, independent approach to modeling by 
assuming that the presence or absence of an edge between two individuals is 
independent of all other edges in the system.  They provide a probability 
measure over unobserved characteristics of a social network in which the 
presence of a tie between two individuals is dependent on the presence of other 
ties.  In other words, the observation of i → j and j → k suggests that i and k are 
not too far apart in social space.  [32] gives a logistic regression model           
(ni,j = log odds(yi,j = 1 | zi, zj, xi,j, α, β) ) in which the probability of a tie depends 
on the Euclidean distance between zi and zj.   
The results from [32] showed that this model may be used to improve the 
statistical uncertainty in the social space to be quantified, to generalize 
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multiple relationships with varying strengths, to leverage limited data, and to 







This chapter reiterates the research questions and puts forth the 
propositions for this study.  The research questions were generated from 
literature related to cognitive radio networks and social networking theory.  As 
seen in the Emergency Management Survey [48], 40 percent of emergency 
respondents use ham radio and fixed radio to communicate during emergency 
operations.  With additional applications in military operations and other 
sentient spaces, there is a need for reliable relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks.  Because these situations are dynamic, emergent, and often chaotic, 
they require reciprocity, coordination, communication, and collaboration 
among users.  This lends social network models as a tool to perform network 
analysis where limited data is available yet a quick response is demanded. 
3.2. Research Questions 
The primary research questions of this study are listed below.  It is 
important to note that the focus of this study is not purely on the use of social 
network theory in cognitive radio networks, but also on the multi-hop network 
setup problem.  As seen in [29], [35], [39], [40], and [43], research has been 
conducted on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic spectrum 
access, behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility.  Therefore, the 
shift in use is to the effectiveness of a social network model to predict relay 
selection in the network setup problem experienced by CRNs.  Chapter 4 
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discusses the methodologies employed to assess the effectiveness of the newly 
proposed reputation-based, power control model, as well as, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of social network models in predicting relay selection. 
1. Is the newly proposed reputation-based model comparable to existing 
trust schemes? 
2. How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary users affected by 
incorporating the proposed game-theoretic approach to network 
formation? 
3. Can network constructions derived from social network models predict 
actual linkages in a cooperative multi-hop relaying network? 
4. What is the current use of social networking theory and social capital to 
predict relay selection in cognitive radio networks? 
3.3. Research Propositions 
The above mentioned research questions can be broken down into four 
areas of discovery: 
Proposition 1:  The new distributed, game-theoretic approach to 
relay selection in CRNs, using trustworthiness as 
social capital, is comparable to existing trust 
schemes. 
Proposition 2: The QoS enjoyed by primary users is improved by 
using secondary users to transmit primary data. 
Proposition 3:   The latent space model [32] may be applied in 
CRNs to predict multi-hop relay selection. 
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Proposition 4: This research presents the first solution to using 
social networking theories in relay selection for 
cognitive radio networks. 
The newly proposed algorithm for relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks is of great interest in this study.  The average trustworthiness of 
users that have implemented the new trust scheme should be comparable to 
existing schemes. (Proposition 1) 
The cooperation framework presented by the RBPCG considers relay 
selection in which the multi-hop relay path is computed by performing the 
players’ strategies in the form of link operations.  It must be determined if a 
Nash Equilibrium exists for the network formation game that maximizes the 
payoff received by primary users that are able to get into cooperation with 
relays. (Proposition 2) 
Due to the overlapping conceptualizations between cognitive radio 
networks and social network theory, this research contends that a social 
network model may be applied to the relay selection problem, with 
modifications directly related to inherent characteristics of CRNs. 
Fletcher et al. reported that the sender-receiver models presented in [31] 
provided the highest predictive accuracy in both of its empirical, mark-
recapture datasets and was the only model that could account for the observed 
directionality in movement, although it predicted a higher level of exchange in 
movement than what was actually observed.  It is reasonable to hypothesize 
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that these techniques will have a similar effect on relay selection in cognitive 
radio networks. (Proposition 3) 
One of the main goals of this research is to determine the use of social 
networking theories and social capital for relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks.  A comprehensive review of literature may support that this research 
is uncharted territory in this field of study.  (Proposition 4) 
3.4. Theoretical Research Model 
This section details the algorithm that provides the framework to test the 
above propositions.  It begins with a brief overview of game theory and 
cooperation incentives. 
3.4.1.Game Theory Overview 
Game theory is the study that analyzes the dynamic strategies of rational 
individuals who are engaged in competitive interactions.  It provides a 
mechanism to predict future moves of an opponent who may have conflicting 
interests.  Game theory has been applied to contexts in war, economics, and 
networks.   
As mentioned earlier, cognitive users must be aware of the changes in 
their environment and be capable of adapting their transmission parameters 
accordingly.  These users have the ability to observe, learn and act to optimize 
their total performance, unlike conventional spectrum sharing where it is 
generally assumed that all users cooperate in a static environment [13].  Within 
this context, game theory can be appropriately applied to the network setup 
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problem because cognitive users are autonomous, opportunistic agents seeking 
to maximize benefits. 
The main components of any game are the set of players, the set of 
strategies, and the utility function.  The set of players are the finite set of 
decision makers.  Each player has a set of strategies.  These are the actions 
that they may choose during game play.  The series of actions performed by 
each player will determine the outcome of the overall game.  The utility 
function associates a numerical payoff for every outcome product of an action 
taken by a player. 
Generally, games may be divided into noncooperative games and 
cooperative games.  In cooperative games, players compete and cooperate to 
form coalitions in unstructured interactions to create and obtain specific 
payoffs.  Cooperative games are out of the scope of this paper.  On the other 
hand, noncooperative games are modeled under the basis that all players make 
choices or play strategies considering only their own selfish interests – their 
final objective is to maximize their own total utility [16].  Noncooperative games 
have various categories that pertain to players’ strategies and the availability of 
information. 
1. Static game:  players make decisions simultaneously, or in 
isolation, with no information about other players’ past or present 
decisions. 
2. Dynamic game:  occurs when there is a strict order of turns that 
the players must obey. 
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3. Complete information game:  all players are conscious of the 
number of players, the strategies, and the utility function of the 
rest. 
4. Incomplete information game:  one or more of the components (the 
number of players, the strategies, and the utility function) of the 
game must be estimated or assumed. 
3.4.2.Cooperation Incentives 
 Cooperative communication has great potential in wireless 
communication, especially when paired with game theory.  A main obstacle 
blocking the widespread use of it is the lack of incentives for users to 
participate in cooperative communication.  There are three primary 
mechanisms designed to provide such incentives:  reputation-based 
mechanism, resource-exchange-based mechanism, and pricing-based 
mechanism. 
 In a reputation-based mechanism, a centralized authority maintains 
history of the cooperative behavior and punishes noncooperative nodes.  Here, 
each node is considered to be a player, and its strategy is whether to cooperate 
with another node.  In general, all players are assumed to play the best 
strategy that yields the best utility.  Cooperative nodes may be awarded 
permission to transmit at a higher power, while noncooperative nodes will be 
punished and not afforded this opportunity. 
 The source node exploits relays for cooperative communication in the 
resource-exchange-based mechanism.  As an award, the source node provides 
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its own resource to help the relay nodes achieve certain objectives [4].  For 
example, in cognitive radio networks, primary users may use secondary users 
as relays.  If the secondary users choose to cooperate, they will obtain access to 
the wireless channel for their own transmissions in return. 
In the pricing-based mechanism, virtual currency or tokens are assumed 
in the network.  Relay nodes sell their resources (e.g. bandwidth, power, time) 
for a certain price.  According to [4], source nodes make payments to relay 
nodes for using their resources.  Often times, a game using this mechanism 
will form either a buyer’s or seller’s market. 
3.4.3.Introduction to the Reputation-Based Power Control Game 
This work will focus on the study of relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks using a reputation-based power control game (RBPCG). This model 
will be a dynamic, incomplete information game.  There is a strict order of play, 
and all players are aware of the number of players and the utility function of 
the players.  Each player does not share their strategies, although some path 
information is shared. 
It considers the case where secondary users coexist with primary users 
to conduct data transmissions.  Primary users are those that have current 
license agreements with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which 
have yet to expire.  Secondary (cognitive) users communicate only in those 
frequencies in which primary users are inactive, and operate based on 
agreements/etiquettes imposed by primary users of the spectrum.  
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An interference temperature is established to protect the primary users.  
The power control problem is one of the most critical issues in such a model.  It 
is formulated in cooperative cognitive radio networks to maximize energy 
efficiency of secondary users and guarantee the quality-of-service (QoS) of both 
primary and secondary users.  The secondary users, equipped as transmitter 
and receiver pairs, sharing a licensed frequency have to regulate their 
transmission power so that the interference temperature limit at a specified 
measurement point is not violated.  The QoS of elastic traffic is directly related 
to signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the receivers, which is a 
result of the transmission power of secondary users.  Secondary users have 
elastic-data applications in which throughput of each user is determined by the 
SINR at its receiver [54].   
Measurement points are nodes that monitor the real-time interference 
temperature of a given frequency band at their locations.  There is interaction 
among the measurement points, primary users, and secondary users.  We 
assume that a measurement point maintains a history of secondary users who 
violate the maximum received power at its location, as well as, monitors the 
interference temperature.  As long as the interference temperature threshold 
(ITT) is not violated, the measurement point will not interfere in the secondary 
users’ operation.  As in [54], if the limit is exceeded, the measurement point 
will notify the secondary users generating the highest interference.  These 
secondary users will back off their data transmissions, upon receiving such a 
notification.  When there are several secondary users generating the same 
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highest interference, the user with the lowest trust will be used to break the tie.  
(Trust will be discussed in future sections.)  If the ITT is still violated, the next 
highest user will be notified to back off.  This process will continue until the 
interference temperature threshold is no longer violated.   
Additionally, this model defines interaction between the primary users 
and the secondary users.  Interaction occurs during relay selection and when a 
defect occurs.  A defect occurs when the measurement point notifies the 
secondary user who is generating the highest received power that the 
interference limit has been violated, when a secondary user chooses to defect 
for selfish reasons (i.e. inefficient power supply), or when a secondary user fails 
to respond to a relay request.  A primary user may notified of a defect by 
secondary users and the measurement point.   
Considering the selfishness of secondary users, this project will be 
modeled as a noncooperative game where all players make choices or play 
strategies considering only their own selfish interests – their final objective is to 
maximize their total utility.  Under the assumption that each user is rational, it 
must be determined if a unique Nash equilibrium can be identified in this 
game.  
This model follows an exclusive use model in which “a licensee (primary 
user) has exclusive and transferable rights to the user of a specified spectrum 
within a defined geographic area, with flexible spectrum use rights that are 
governed primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum against interference” 
[54].  The defined geographic area is the effective communication area (ECA).  
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The exclusive use model introduces a metric called interference temperature to 
quantify and manage the interference in the ECA and provide protection to 
primary users.  Based on such a metric, a primary user sets up an interference 
temperature threshold under which secondary users can coexist with primary 
users.  The ITT must not be violated at the primary user’s receiver.  According 
to the FCC, interference temperature threshold ITT is specified in Kelvin and is 
defined as 
ITT(m, W) = 
𝑃𝐼(𝑚,𝑊)
𝑘𝑊
     (1) 
 
where PI is the average interference power in Watts centered at m, covering 
bandwidth W measured in Hertz, and the Boltzmann’s constant k is 1.38x10-23 
Joules per Kelvin degree.  The FCC would establish an interference 
temperature threshold (ITT) for a given geographic area.  This is the highest 
tolerable interference for a given bandwidth in a particular location.  Any 
unlicensed user utilizing this bandwidth must guarantee that their 
transmissions, added to the existing interference, must not surpass the 
interference temperature threshold at a licensed receiver. 
3.4.4.System Model 
The system model we study is an IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless 
Access System (WiMAX).  The primary wireless network is OFDMA-based.  We 
focus on relay selection in multi-hop communication between primary 
transmitter-receiver pairs that maximizes energy efficiency of secondary users 
and guarantees the quality-of-service (QoS) of both primary and secondary 
users.  The system model is provided in Figure 4.  There is one primary 
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transmitter (PT), primary receiver (PR) pair.  The PT owns the license for PU 
Band 1, and the PR owns the license for PU Band 2. The effective 
communication areas (ECA) are denoted by a and b, for PU Band 1 and PU 
Band 2 respectively.  The other nodes are secondary users.  They are either 
located in communication area a or b.  
There are two measurement points, xa and xb.  These measurement 
points monitor the interference temperature thresholds of the effective 
communication areas and maintain a history of user violations.  xa and xb are 
located on the boundary of a and b, respectively, with the shortest distance to 
a or b. 
Figure 4:  RBPCG System Model 
3.4.5.Utility Functions 
We make the following assumptions with respect to the communication 
network.  We assume at an ECA a primary user offers a portion of its frequency 
PU Band 1 






spectrum to be shared among a set of secondary users.  Each secondary user 
is a transmitter-receiver pair.  All secondary users use decode-and-forward 
multi-hopping to relay primary data. 
The interference temperature threshold is interpreted as a threshold of 
the total receiver power at a specified measurement point.  This is denoted by 
Ta and Tb, for each licensee’s designated geographic area.  Following [54] and 




𝑚𝑖𝑛  ≤  𝑝𝑖  ≤  𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁     (2)
We let Pi = (0, +∞), which is interpreted as the achievable power of 
secondary users can generate interference much higher than the power 
threshold at the measurement point [54].  N is the total number of secondary 
users. 
The link gain from user i’s transmitter to user j’s receiver is gij and the 
link gain from i’s transmitter to a measurement point is gim, where m is either 
xa or xb.  Then the ITT for the designated geographic areas are denoted by 
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑥𝑎
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑇𝑎     (3) 
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑥𝑏 ≤ 𝑇𝑏
𝑁
𝑖=𝑛+1  (4) 
where n is the number of secondary users interfering with the primary 
transmitter and N-n denotes the number of secondary users interfering with 
the primary receiver.  Similar functions are used in [28] and [54]. 
First, we consider the case when no relays are employed for 






  (5) 
(5) is used in [5], [28], [54], and [57], with some variations. 
As stated earlier, secondary users produce elastic traffic in which 
throughput of each user is determined by the SINR at its receiver.  When user i 
is not backed off by the measurement point, the quality of service (QoS) enjoyed 
by user i in a specified effective communication area is characterized by a 
function ui(𝛾i), where 𝛾i is the SINR at user i’s receiver, 





 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁     (6) 
where 𝜎2 is the background noise at secondary receiver j, {u, … , v} is the set of 
secondary users that interfere with each other in a given ECA, and p is the 
transmit power vector of a given ECA.  
The efficiency function ui defined for this project 
𝑢𝑖(𝛾𝑖) = ln(𝛾𝑖)     (7) 
presents the throughput of communication systems in the high SINR regime.  
This efficiency function is also used in [54] and [57]. 
If user i is backed off, then its utility is 0.  B denotes the set of secondary 
users that have backed off their transmissions.  B includes the users with the 
largest interference at a measurement point.  B is set to null after a designated 
number of data transmissions, in order to allow those users to re-enter play.  
p* is the transmit power vector after the backing off process.  Ui denotes user i’s 
utility. 
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𝑢𝑖(𝒑), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚  ≤ 𝑇
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
𝑢𝑖(𝒑
∗), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 𝑔𝑖𝑚  > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵
     (8) 
where T is the interference temperature threshold for a certain effective 
communication area, denoted by Ta or Tb.  The above utility function Ui (p) 
follows that of [54]. However, [54] only considers a single effective 
communication area. 
Also, the existing utility function does not embody the effect of trust in 
relay selection.  However, we can introduce pricing as an effective tool to 
qualify such effects.  An efficient pricing mechanism will encourage secondary 
users to share resources in order to maximize their utility.  The pricing 
function is denoted by τ.  
A pricing function is used for incorporating direct trust and reputation 
into a probabilistic formulation.  This mechanism provides not only a trust 
measure about a neighbor, but also a level of confidence (C) that must be 
maintained in order to forward network traffic.  The approach incorporates 
both positive (α) and negative (β) vectors to calculate the belief against the 
required level of confidence.  
Each user maintains a set of α and β vectors that represent the histories 
of interactions with other users.  If a user is sent a request to forward network 
traffic and they do not respond, this is considered a β observation.  A non-
response may indicate a node failure and the primary transmitter is notified.  A 
response may be either positive or negative.  All users are initially trusted. 
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Each time a user receives a request from another user, it will evaluate 
the trust model to determine whether to participate.  The trust model provides 
the mean probability that a user can be trusted, based on its own observations 
(direct trust) and those from all one-hop neighbors shared by both users 
(reputation).  The user will not be trusted if the trust value is less than the 
confidence level.  A user is considered to be on punishment once its confidence 
level drops below the minimum.  In repeated play, a succession of positive 
observations can move an untrusted neighbor back to being trusted again. 
Initially, α = 1 and β = 0.  H is the set of one-hop neighbors for a 
specified user.  A user i’s measure of trust (direct trust) for any given one-hop 
neighbor is computed by a function ti(h).  The value of ti(h) is expected to be 
𝑡𝑖(ℎ) =  
𝛼+1
(𝛼+𝛽)+1
     (9) 
 
where h ∈ H, α is the number of successful interactions at a given time, and β 
is the number of unsuccessful interactions at a given time between i and h, 
with respect to i.   
The trust value of a requester (reputation), τ, is expected to be: 
𝜏𝐿 = 




, ∀𝑦 ∈ 𝑆     (10) 
 
where S is the set of shared neighbors between user i, that has received a 
request, and the requester, L.  The number of shared neighbors is denoted by 
s.  The requesting node uses the same scheme to determine the trust of its 
one-hop neighbors.  Both the primary transmitters and primary receivers are 
always trusted. 
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In this game, each user must decide between two strategies:  cooperate 
or defect.  The primary transmitters and primary receivers always cooperate.  It 
is assumed that the player initiating a move has agreed to cooperate and will 
continue play.   
Taking the pricing function into consideration, the utility function Ui is  




𝑢𝑖(𝒑), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚  ≤ 𝑇
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
𝑢𝑖(𝒑
∗), 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 𝑔𝑖𝑚  > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ∉ 𝐵
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 > 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝜏𝑖 < 𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵)
0, 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚
𝑣
𝑖=𝑢 ≤ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝜏𝑖 < 𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵)
    (11) 
  
3.4.6.Relay Selection Game Formulation 
This model produces empirical evidence that can be used to predict if a 
PT-PR pair will be able to get into cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the 
probability of establishing a path) that improve its SINR.  Initially, the primary 
transmitter will perform direct transmission to the primary receiver in order to 
establish the baseline SINR.  Once the baseline SINR has been determined, the 
PT-PR pair will resend the signal by employing the help of secondary users. 
In this relay selection game, the players consist of the transmitters and 
the receivers of the primary communication pairs and the secondary users, 
which are denoted as primary players and secondary players, respectively.  The 
players are connected according to some network relationship summarized by 
an undirected graph G(V, E), with V being the players and E being the set of 
links connecting two interacting players in the game.   
Definition 1:  (Path)  A path, D, of the PT-PR pair is defined as a subset of E 
consisting of a sequence of players, i.e. D = {(vk, vk+1) ∈ E | k = 1, 2, …, k-1, v1 = 
49 
PT, vk = PR}, and (vk, vk+1) is a directed link from vk to vk+1 and k is the number 
of players on the path.   
In this game, the action of each player is reflected by the operation on 
links.  The action space contains two operations:  add a link or back-off a link.  
The primary players, specifically the PT, initiate the cooperation.  Secondary 
users may accept or reject a request for cooperation.  The PR does not play any 
strategies.  The measurement point monitors communication links. 
Definition 2:  (Action Space)  The action space of PT is defined as S = {s(i) = 
[+(vk, SUi), -(vk, SUi)] | SUi ∈ (N ∩ V) \ VD, vk ∈ VD}.   
In other words, a strategy is a sequence of actions that form 
communication links by adding a link, +(vk, SUi), or backing off a link, -(vk, 
SUi).  D+s(i) denotes the modified path after an action is taken. 
Definition 3:  (Beneficial Action)  An action s(i) ∈ S is a beneficial action for PT 
if and only if ui(𝛾i) > uPT(𝛾PT) and 𝜏i ≥ C. 
Definition 4:  (Action Preference List)  An action preference list 𝑆̅ is the set of 
all its beneficial actions sorted in increasing order of distance from the PT.   
The action preference list is limited to one-hop neighbors.  According to 
the simple path loss model in [28], link gain is a strictly decreasing function of 
the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, so the following 
inequations are satisfied in our system model of Figure 4. 
𝑔𝑃𝑇,1  >  𝑔𝑃𝑇,𝑃𝑅, 𝑔𝑃𝑇,3 > 𝑔𝑃𝑇,𝑃𝑅     (12) 
 
Definition 5:  (Best Action)  An action s(i*) ∈ S is the best action of PT if and 
only if s(i*) is in the first place of the action preference list 𝑆̅. 
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3.4.7.Algorithm 
We assume that each player wants to maximize their own utility.  Players 
want to use large transmission power to obtain high SINR at the receiver.  
Initially, D = ∅.  During the distributed relay selection process, the PT exploits 
the measurement point to determine the next-hop relay.  The PT selects the 
next-hop relay according to the following steps: 
1. QoS Arbitration
PT announces its cooperation information to its one-hop neighbors, 
identified by the measurement point.  Then each neighbor determines its 
QoS (ui(𝛾i)) obtained from PT and feedbacks the cooperation information, 
including its transmit power from Pi.  
2. Handover Request
After receiving the replies from all one-hop neighbors, PT computes the 
payoff (Ui (p)) for the add action in S and makes the corresponding action 
preference list 𝑆̅.  If 𝑆̅ = ∅, PT does not have any incentive to cooperate.
Otherwise, it sends an offer to SUi*, which corresponds to the best action 
s(i*), and then removes s(i*) from 𝑆̅.  With this removal, the best action of
PT changes after each handover request and an SU receives the offer 
from PT at most once during each round.  
3. Cooperation Agreement
PT gets into cooperation with SUi* if its offer is accepted, and it is out of 
cooperation if it is rejected by SUi*.  At this point, the measurement point 
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determines the allowable QoS of each secondary player in the given ECA, 
using an inverse linear distribution that affords s(i*) the greatest gain. 
Algorithm 1 Reputation-Based Power Control Game 
Initialization:  the network graph G(V, E), D = ∅, k = 0 
repeat 
k = k + 1 
PT announces cooperation information to H 
for all SUi : H 
Compute ui(𝛾i) 
Send PT cooperation information 
PT computes Ui(p) for all H 
if 𝑆̅ ≠ ∅ 
Remove s(i*) associated with SUi* from 𝑆̅   
SUi* accepts PT 
Measurement point broadcasts allowable QoS 
else 
PT sends direct transmission to PR 
until vk = PR 
3.4.8.Game Model 
We consider a game in strategic form.  Let RBPCG = [K, {Pi}, {Ui}] denote 
the noncooperative reputation-based, power control game.  Here K are the set 
of players on a path from PT to PR.  Each player picks a transmit power from 
the strategy space Pi which is continuous and receives a payoff Ui (p). 
Theorem:  There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) for the RBPCG, a path 
profile (strategy profile), which is 
d* = (𝑑1
∗, 𝑑2
∗ , … , 𝑑𝑘
∗ )  (13) 
Proof:  In the case of cooperative communication, the received SINR from PT to 
PR will be the smallest of the multi-hop relaying.  An effective SINR (𝛾e) is 
defined to describe this. 
𝛾𝑒 = min (𝛾𝑣2 , … , 𝛾𝑣𝑘)  (14)
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By definition, the best action s(i*) has a utility that is greater than that of 
a direct transmission.  If 𝛾𝑣𝑖 > 𝛾𝑃𝑇 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 and ui(𝛾i) > 𝑢𝑃𝑇(𝛾𝑃𝑇) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐾, then 𝛾𝑒 >
𝛾𝑃𝑇 and ue(𝛾e) > 𝑢𝑃𝑇(𝛾𝑃𝑇).  Therefore, a path profile d* is a NE if it is a fixed point 
of the best responses, i.e. 
𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖
∗, 𝑑−𝑖
∗ ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖
′, 𝑑−𝑖
∗ )  (15)
for any 𝑑−𝑖
∗  and any user i.  Here, 𝑑−𝑖
∗ = (𝑑1
∗, … , 𝑑𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑑𝑖+1
∗ , … , 𝑑𝐾
∗ ).  In a Nash
equilibrium, none of the players can improve its utility function by unilaterally 
changing its next-hop relay.  Therefore, a NE is a stable outcome of the game. 
Lemma 1:  The NE for the RBPCG maximizes the payoff Ui (p) when each 
player is afforded a QoS allocation at the measurement point by using an 





(A – ei)  (16) 
Proof:  The reason this maximizes the utility function for a given path profile is 
explained as follows.  
According to Definition 4, players in the action preference list are ranked 
according to the simple path loss model.  Let ei for i = 1, 2, …, n be the distance 
of each player in a given effective communication area.  The set of nodes ei ∀𝑖 ∈
𝑛 consists of the players in 𝑆̅ (listed first) followed by the remaining nodes in 
the ECA (sorted in increasing order of distance from PT).  A = max ei is the 
distance of the player with the largest distance from the PT.  An inverse linear 
distribution can be identified using the variable xi = A – ei, where each fi (pigim) 
is proportional to xi. 
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After substitutions of fi and xi, the formula becomes 




Further simplification, results in 








where E is the sum of all distances. 








(𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖) 
Therefore, 𝑑𝑖
∗ is afforded the highest transmit power in order to maximize Ui (p).
The outcome for a given game is Pareto optimal if it is not possible for all 
the players to improve their payoffs by collectively agreeing to choose a strategy 
different from the Nash equilibrium.  In other words, one player’s payoff cannot 
be improved without making another player’s payoff less. 
Lemma 2:  The Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal if and only if the power 
threshold is reached at any given link along the path. 
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Proof:  Suppose there exists a path D = (𝑣1, …, 𝑣𝑖, …, 𝑣𝑘).  If the power 
constraint is not tight at each link (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘+1), then any player may choose to 
deviate from such a cooperatively agreed-upon strategy in order to improve 
their payoff at the group’s expense.  That is, at each link there exists a power 
vector p = (𝑝1, …, 𝑝𝑖, …, 𝑝𝑛).  If any player chooses to increase its transmit 
power by some factor 𝜃, its SINR will also be increased.  This would also result 
in a new power vector p′ = (𝑝1
′ , … , 𝑝𝑖
′, … , 𝑝𝑛
′ ) and a new path D′.  However, this 
increase by a single player causes  
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚 = 𝑇 +  𝜃
𝑛
𝑖=1   (17) 
which violates the ITT and causes the player with the highest power (i.e. the 
player chosen to establish a link based on the inverse linear distribution) to be 
backed off.  This Pareto optimal outcome describes a social optimal in the 
sense that no individual player can improve its payoff without making at least 
one other player worse off. 
3.4.9. Performance of Nash Equilibrium 
Now, let’s consider the performance of the Nash equilibrium.  Pareto 
optimal implies social optimal in our system which in turn results in a tight 





Denote 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑚, the system optimization problem can be presented by a 
constrained maximization problem.  We want to maximize ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑓𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
constrained by ∑ 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑇
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  Using the Lagrangian multiplier, we have the 
following equations: 
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𝐿(𝑓𝑖, 𝜆) =  ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑓𝑖) − 𝜆(∑ 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑇) =  ∑ 𝑙𝑛
𝑓𝑖
𝑇−𝑓𝑖−𝜎𝑚













(𝑇 − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚)(𝑇 − 2𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚)
𝑓𝑖(𝑇 − 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜎𝑚)2








(𝐴 − 𝑒𝑖), because ∑ 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑇
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  Based on the first order condition, the 









This chapter reports the research methodology that was employed to 
address the research questions and to test the research propositions.  The 
simulation environment is described here in detail.  This dissertation focuses 
on a need to understand the social networking aspect of relay selection in 
cognitive radio networks.  It aims to determine if humanistic behavior patterns 
may be applied to forming a successful communication chain in CRNs.  
4.2. Research Methodology 
In order to address the first research question, “Is the newly proposed 
reputation-based model comparable to existing trust schemes?”, the 
average trust values of randomly chosen nodes using the RBPCG are compared 
to the existing CONFIDANT and Information Theoretic schemes presented in 
[39]. 
To address the second research question, “How is the quality-of-
service (QoS) for primary users affected by incorporating the proposed 
game-theoretic approach to network formation?”, a number of simulations 
were conducted to analyze the probability that a PT-PR pair will be able to get 
into cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the probability of establishing a path) 
that improves its SINR.  The details of the simulation environment are outlined 
in the next sections. 
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For the third research question, “Can network constructions derived 
from social network models predict actual linkages in a cooperative multi-
hop relaying network?”, a number of simulations were conducted to analyze 
the use of the Latent Space in predicting relay selection.  The details of the 
simulation environment are outlined in the next section.   
Transition matrices were generated for each scenario conducted during 
simulation that identify probability measures that a given user will be chosen 
during any given round of play, based on observations from 100 rounds of 
play.  In the n x n matrix, senders are represented as rows, and one-hop 
neighbors are represented as columns, for any given network.  The grand mean 
frequency for each sender’s one-hop neighbors is an entry in the transition 
matrix.  Output from the simulations was analyzed by overlay plots.   
For the final research question, “What is the current use of social 
networking theory and social capital to predict relay selection in 
cognitive radio networks?”, a comprehensive review of literature is 
performed.  Detailed comparisons and contrasts will be provided of the 
findings. 
4.3. Simulation Environment 
We consider a multi-channel primary wireless network based on WiMAX 
(Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), with multiple SUs assisting 
PUs on the uplink.  This research proposes a technique that serves as an add-
on component to the existing primary network and is opportunistically 
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harvested.  It does not call for major change in the existing primary 
infrastructure, and therefore is of great practical interest. 
 WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) refers to the 
interoperable implementations of a wireless communications standard (IEEE 
802.16).  WiMAX is similar to WiFi, but on a much larger scale and at faster 
speeds.  802.11 has ranges up to about 820ft and 54Mbps, while 802.16 has 
ranges up to about 40 miles and 70Mbps.  802.16’s primary application is 
broadband wireless access.  In contrast, 802.11 is intended for wireless local 
area networks (LANs).  The bandwidth and range of WiMAX make it suitable for 
providing “portable mobile broadband connectivity across cities and countries 
through a variety of devices” [58].  WiMAX has the potential to do to broadband 
Internet access what cell phones have done to phone access.  It operates on the 
same general principle as WiFi, sending data from one computer to another 
using radio signals. [59] 
 The WiMAX module provided by ns-3 provides a MAC and PHY level 
implementation of the 802.16 standard with point-to-multipoint mode and a 
wirelessMAN-OFDMA PHY layer.  The figure below shows the WiMAX 
architecture. 
 In this infrastructure, the uplink scheduler at the base station decides 
which of the secondary users will be assigned uplink allocations based on the 
QoS parameters associated with the RBPCG.  When a service flow is created, 
the uplink schedule calculates necessary parameters based on the QoS 
requirements. 
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Figure 5:  WiMAX Architecture [60] 
4.4. Simulation Parameters 
The existing WiMAX module in ns-3 will be used as the control group. 
There will be two primary base stations.  To check the impact of the number of 
relays, we will uniformly deploy 5, 20, 100, 200, 500, and 1000 secondary 
users within the network.  A network graph G is randomly generated for each 
scenario.  This network graph identifies each user’s one-hop neighbors and 
their distances from each other, along with the primary base station that it is 
in the vicinity of.  The interference temperature threshold (ITT) is 11dB for a 
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network on the 2.5GHz frequency band, using 16QAM (1/2) modulation.  The 
threshold of the number of rounds of plays for each network is 100. 
We investigate the performance of the RBPCG based on the following 
performance metrics: 
 the average packet loss,
 the ratio of transmissions with improved SINR from cooperative
communication, 
 the average SINR of direct transmissions compared to the average
effective SINR, 
 the minimum edit distances,
 the average path length, and
 the standard deviations of the mean SINR .
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings and statistical results for the 
dissertation.  Various analyses were performed in this study.  JMP® 11.2.0 
statistical software was used in the numerical experiments. 
5.2. Analysis of Research Question 1 
Let’s consider the first proposition:  “The new distributed, game-theoretic 
approach to relay selection in CRNs, using trustworthiness as social capital, is 
comparable to existing trust schemes”.  In [39], Pai et al. discussed the 
Information Theoretic scheme and the CONFIDANT scheme.  Both of these 
trust mechanisms have been proposed in wireless ad hoc networks.  In these 
schemes, a trust value, also called a direct trust value, is assigned by node i to 
node j as a function of a history of positive and negative interactions with that 
node.  The Information Theoretic scheme using the binary entropy function 
∑ 𝑝(𝑥)logp(x)𝑥  to update the direct trust values.  The CONFIDANT scheme uses 
a beta probability function 
𝛼
𝛼+ 𝛽
 to update the direct trust values.  
The reputation-based trust model for the RBPCG also uses a beta 
probability function; however, it takes into account both alpha and beta 
vectors, along with consideration of ITT violations.  In order to compare the 
RBPCG scheme with the Information Theoretic and CONFIDANT schemes, the 
trust value of nodes was observed and recorded after the 100 rounds of game 
play.  Various confidence levels were used in order to aid in the comparison. 
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The subjects of one such comparison are listed below. 
 node 2 from the 5-node network  
 node 13 from the 20-node network 
 node 24 from the 100-node network 
 node 99 from the 200-node network 
 node 200 from the 500-node network 
 node 682 from the 1000-node network 
The table below offers a visual comparison of the subjects’ final trust value.  
These values are based on observations from all one-hop neighbors. 
 It is evident from this table that the trust values assigned using the 
Information Theoretic scheme, decrease much slower than both the 
CONFIDANT and RBPCG schemes.  The RBPCG trust model is comparable to 
the CONFIDANT trust mechanism with average trust values differing from 
0.0001 to 0.02.  This theoretical trust model is the framework used to analyze 
the research questions and propositions. 
5.3. Analysis of Research Question 2 
The research question, “How is the quality-of-service (QoS) for primary 
users affected by incorporating the proposed game-theoretic approach to 
network formation?”, was investigated by comparing various network metrics. 
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Table 1:  Trust Scheme Comparisons 
# 
Nodes Trust Threshold 0.3 0.5 0.7 
5 
CONFIDANT 0.7011 0.7014 0.7014 
Information 
Theoretic 0.9144 0.9144 0.9144 
New Scheme 0.7010 0.7011 0.7011 
20 
CONFIDANT 0.8736 0.8736 0.8736 
Information 
Theoretic 0.9090 0.9090 0.9090 
New Scheme 0.8527 0.8527 0.8527 
100 
CONFIDANT 0.6881 0.6882 0.6882 
Information 
Theoretic 0.7215 0.7215 0.7215 
New Scheme 0.6867 0.6867 0.6867 
200 
CONFIDANT 0.7477 0.7477 0.7477 
Information 
Theoretic 0.8220 0.8221 0.8221 
New Scheme 0.7333 0.7333 0.7333 
500 
CONFIDANT 0.8961 0.8961 0.8961 
Information 
Theoretic 0.9722 0.9722 0.9722 
New Scheme 0.8880 0.8880 0.8880 
1000 
CONFIDANT 0.8419 0.8420 0.8420 
Information 
Theoretic 0.9254 0.9254 0.9254 
New Scheme 0.8363 0.8363 0.8363 
A number of simulations were conducted to determine if the newly 
proposed algorithm is comparable in performance to the existing infrastructure 
and to analyze the probability that a PT-PR pair will be able to get into 
cooperation with a set of relays (i.e. the probability of establishing a path) that 
improve its SINR.  
The figure below describes the ratio of packet loss.  Packet loss varies 
based on details of the data transmission including, but not limited to, 
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modulation and coding.  The red line represents the system without RBPCG, 
and the blue line represents with RBPCG.  There is a slight decrease in packet 
loss with the RBPCG.  This may be attributed to the cooperative 
communication employed by RBPCG that affords higher SINR to relays 
agreeing to assist the primary users.  Higher SINR guarantees a better signal at 
the receiver. 
 
Figure 6:  Packet Loss Without RBPCG versus With RBPCG 
 The next figure demonstrates the percent of transmissions (i.e. rounds of 
game play) that utilized cooperative communication and, therefore, the primary 
users enjoyed a higher payoff.  It is evident from the research that this 
improvement decreases as the number of nodes increases. 
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Figure 7:  Ratio of Transmissions with Improved SINR 
Consider Figure 8.  Here, the bilinear model, fitted to a cubic polynomial 
function with Rsquare of 0.918, appears to show that the average SINR enjoyed 
by primary users in direct transmissions is a good predictor of the effective 
SINR enjoyed by the same users using cooperative communication.  However, 
the average effective SINR is slightly lower than that of direct transmissions. 
5.4. Analysis of Research Question 3 
Due to the overlapping conceptualizations between cognitive radio 
networks and social network theory, a social network model was applied to the 
relay selection problem.  The third proposition states “The latent space model 
[32] may be applied in CRNs to predict relay selection”.  Logistic regression 
analysis was used to explore the applicability of the Latent Space model to 
relay selection in cognitive radio networks.  
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Figure 8:  Average SINR of DTs Compared to Average Effective SINR 
In this social network model, Hoff et al. provide a probability measure 
over unobserved characteristics of a social network in which the presence of a 
tie between two individuals is dependent on the presence of other ties.  In other 
words, the observation of i → j and j → k suggests that i and k are not too far 
apart in social space. 
 [32] uses the log odds function to estimate unobserved ties.  In the 
cognitive radio network scenario, the log odds model can be used to construct a 
Markov chain. A Markov chain can be described as a set of states 
Z = {Z0, Z1, …, Zr}, where Z0 is the start state.  ?̂? = {Zi, …, Zh} is the set of states 
where the Euclidean distance from the current state is 1, and h is the number 
of one-hop neighbors for a given user.  The basic algorithm is to reiterate the 
steps below. The process described is initiated by the primary transmitter. 
1. Using Z0 = ?̂? as a starting state.  Construct a Markov chain over 
model parameters as follows: 
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a. for all i : h 
i. Z′ = arg max Q(i, a) 
b. Accept Z′ with probability ℙ(Ri|a), where ℙ(Ri|a) is the value 
from the transition matrix. 
2. Repeat this process using the node selected in step 2. 
Here, Q is the value of the log odds function with i and a providing indexes into 
the corresponding transition matrix. 
In each case, the Latent Space model [32] can eventually predict the 
actual path for each network with 100% accuracy.  Table 2 provides the 
minimum edit distance (Levenshtein distance) between the actual path and the 
predicted path for each network.  The minimum edit distance is a way of 
quantifying how different two strings are to one another by counting the 
minimum number of operations (insert, delete, and substitute) required to 
transform one string into the other.  The prediction is 100% accurate to the 
stable path at the completion of the 100th round.  In other words, the minimum 
edit distance is zero at the end of each game.  This is true in all scenarios, 
across all networks. 
 The figure that demonstrates the average path length clearly shows that 
the average path length increases as the number of nodes in the network 
increases.  This can be expected as the density of users increases in a given 
effective communication area.  Therefore, a growth in the number of secondary 
users willing to cooperate with primary users is demonstrated. 
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Table 2:  Minimum Edit Distances for All Games 
Set  5 Nodes 20 Nodes 100 Nodes 200 Nodes 500 Nodes 
1000 
Nodes 
1 2 4 12 15 8 10 
2 1 5 10 10 8 10 
3 2 3 6 6 4 7 
4 1 5 6 4 1 3 
5 0 4 2 4 0 0 
6 0 4 0 2 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 9:  Average Path Length 
The next figure shows the standard deviation of the average SINR of each 
network scenario.  The mean comparisons are between the network scenarios 
with and without the reputation-based power control game.  It’s obvious that 
there is little variation in the data sets. 
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Figure 10:  SINR Comparisons 
5.5. Analysis of Research Question 4 
To address the last research question, “What is the current use of social 
networking theory and social capital to predict relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks?”, an exhaustive review of literature was conducted for research 
related to using social network models as a tool to predict relay selection in 
CRNs.  This search has shown a severe inadequacy of research in this area.  As 
noted in Section 2.3.3, [29], [35], [39], [40], and [43] have conducted research 
on using SNT in CRNs related to discovering dynamic spectrum access, 
behavior propagation, bidirectional ties, and mobility.  To my best knowledge, 
this research is the first to study the use of social network models to predict 
relay selection in cognitive radio networks. This is one of the major 
contributions of this dissertation. 
The table below identifies the literature discovered that is relevant to 
































Behavior Propagation in Cognitive Radio 
Networks: A Social Network Approach 2014
Li, Song, Chen, Lai, 
Qiu Yes No
Studied social behavior 
propagation in CRNs by applying 
the model of interacting particles 
Improving the Community Behavior of Social 




Proposed a mobility model to 
detect the movement of nodes
Trust-aware Resource Allocation in a Cognitive 
Radio System 2012
Qin, Leung, Miao, 
Chen Yes No
Developed a mechanism where 
trustworthiness is used as social 
capital to improve radio 
spectrum utilization
Trust-based Data Fusion Mechanism Design in 
Cognitive Radio Networks 2014 Wang and Chen Yes No
Developed a trust-based data 
aggregation scheme to enhance 
spectrum sensing capabilities
Using Social Network Theory Towards 
Development of Wireless Ad hoc Network 
Trust 2007
Pai, Roosta, Wicker, 
Sastry Yes No
Proposed a trust-based scheme 
that uses balance theory to 





This research examined the applicability of social networking and social 
capital theories in the context of cognitive radio networks’ ability to predict 
users’ intentions in network formation, a technique that could be utilized in 
many real world scenarios.  A major concern in CRNs is relay selection in a 
distributed, multi-hop environment.  The cooperation between the primary and 
secondary users is critical to accomplish this.  Cognitive users are similar to 
humans in social networks as they can sense their environment, make 
decisions based on observations, and act on these decisions.  
These similarities allow cognitive radio networks to be likened to online 
communities.  The social phenomena underlying online communities can be 
directly related to network formation.  Research in building, discovering and 
analyzing online communities is increasingly important as the Internet 
becomes the largest collection of ideas, personalities, and cultures in history.  
These communities represent groups of individuals connected by some social 
relation, such as a trusted contact link in a business network, a family 
relationship, or a collegiate organization. 
In this dissertation, a novel network formation game is applied to form a 
multi-hop path between a primary transmitter and its receiver, employing 
secondary users as relays.  It also focused on a need to understand the social 
networking aspect of relay selection in cognitive radio networks.  One of its 
main contributions is that it provides empirical data showing that a social 
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network model may be applied to predicting relay selection in cognitive radio 
networks.  
This research has shown that this technique has not been applied 
previously to relay selection in cognitive radio networks.  Table 3 shows 
evidence of studies that applied social network theory to cognitive radio 
networks.  None of these studies used it in relay selection. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the research propositions.  
As with all research, the current study has certain limitations.  They include 
the following: 
 Small sample size,
 Theoretical study as opposed to field study, and
 Use of a social network model not specifically designed to evaluate
the field of cognitive radio networks. 
An overall recommendation is to continue research that leads to the 
improvement of the RBPCG algorithm and tests the applicability of more social 
network models to relay selection in cognitive radio networks. 
73 
Table 4:  Summary of Results 
Propositions Results 
P1:  The new distributed, game-
theoretic approach to relay selection in 
CRNs, using trustworthiness as social 
capital, is comparable to current trust 
schemes. 
The reputation-based technique 
introduced here decreases at a faster 
rate than the Information Theoretic 
scheme and the CONFIDANT schemes. 
P2:  The QoS enjoyed by primary users 
is improved by using secondary users to 
transmit primary data. 
The rate of packet loss is slightly lower 
after the RBPCG is introduced. 
The average effective SINR of 
cooperative communication is slightly 
lower than that of direct transmissions. 
P3:  The latent space model [32] may be 
applied in CRNs to predict relay 
selection. 
The latent space model [32] may be 
applied to relay selection and provided 
100% accuracy of prediction to stable 
paths. 
P4:  This research presents the first 
solution to using social networking 
theories in relay selection for cognitive 
radio networks. 
This is the first study of the 
applicability of social networking 
theories in relay selection for CRNs. 
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